

EXERCISE ONLY: FOR TRAINING PURPOSES

Name of Exercise	IED-TM Exercise 3 – Convoy Movement Exercise
Objective of Exercise	To assess the participants on their understanding on how to conduct terrain analysis and threat analysis of a particular route and present a threat assessment of the route and plan how to conduct convoy movements in IED threat environment.
Aim	The aim of the exercise is to highlight the relevance of conducting route analysis, understanding the IED threat along the route in order to plan how to conduct convoy movement in the Area of Operation.
Situation	<p>You are the IED Threat Mitigation Advisor working in a Battalion HQ. A new Forward Operating Base (FOB) is planning to be built in a remote area of Sector 2 approximately 25km North West of your current location. The date is 20 April 2024.</p> <p>Situation. Following the UNSCR 1544 (2023) a Bn FOB was established near PIKSEK to provide security from a rising insurgent activity targeting security forces in the NORTH WEST of CARANA. The UNAC Bn in the area was initially highly effective but in recent months the insurgent groups have increased their activity targeting remote local security force outposts and resorting more and more to the use of IEDs as a weapon. Increasingly, UN troops are the target of insurgent attacks. A decision has been made to establish a new Company level FOB to the south of TRITH to support local security forces and deny freedom of movement to the insurgents.</p> <p>Enemy Forces. Insurgent forces remain active to the NORTH of PIKSEK. They are well trained and resourced and retain the capability to launch well-planned, coordinated operations. The insurgents have shown the capacity to make a variety of IEDs and they are known to be well equipped with small arms (mainly AK style weapons). The insurgents are politically motivated not ideologically/religiously motivated and so suicide attacks are extremely rare. They tend to operate in small cells of about 30 fighters but they will rarely be found in groups larger than eight to avoid being identified. They do not wear a uniform, opting to dress in local attire. They use normal civilian vehicles and motorcycles. The insurgents also make use of the restrictive high terrain which can only be accessed by foot. There is assessed to be one cell operating in the area of operations. The insurgents do not target civilians as they do not want antagonize the local population who, although do not support the insurgents, also tolerate their presence out of fear of retribution. Occasionally IEDs are used to initiate complex attack type ambushes in both rural and urban areas.</p> <p>Friendly Forces. The security situation in close proximity to PIKSEK has stabilised. In order to improve the security force's presence, a Forward Operating Base (FOB) location has been identified in to the SOUTH of TRITH and an operation to secure it is to be completed in the coming weeks. An infantry company group with an EOD team attached has been tasked to secure and clear the site prior to construction work starting.</p>

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
Mission	<p>MISSION. UNAC Bn is to conduct convoy support between PIKSEK and TRITH in order to allow a new FOB to be CONSTRUCTED and subsequently DENY insurgents freedom of movement.</p> <p>EXECUTION - Concept of Operations.</p> <p>a. Intent. To support the convoy movement from SUROUN to LOPKAS by providing protection to the convoy and performing route clearance of IED threat along the alternative supply route (ASR).</p> <p>b. Scheme of Manoeuvre. This operation will be conducted by UNAC Bn no later than 30 Apr 2024 to enable engineers to construct new FOB no later than 15 May 2024.</p>
Exercise Requirements	<p>You are the IED TM advisor to your HQ. You are to give a brief to the commander on risk reduction for the movement to the new FOB, as part of the wider mission planning.</p> <p>Specific requirements. You are to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Carry out a Threat Assessment• Carry out a route analysis:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Establish your Areas of Interest (AOI)○ Gather Information on all AOIs○ Establish all VA's and VP's.○ Assign mitigation measures to all VA's and VP's.• Plan a convoy move implementing threat mitigations measures and coordinating all supporting assets. <p>You are to brief the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Brief your threat assessment.• Brief your route analysis.• Brief your suggested mitigation measures.• Brief a proposed Course of Action which incorporates<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Task Org○ A scheme of manoeuvre (outline plan)○ Phases of the operation○ Key timings

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Convoy plan i.e. What is the order of march and where are assets placed in the convoy including ECM to ensure coverage of whole convoy.● What are your key risks and what do you require to address the risks.
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
Map of CARANA in General



Area Of Operation



Alternative Supply Route



Additional Supplementary Information to be found in the slide pack

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Instructor Guidance – NOT TO BE ISSUED TO STUDENTS

The instructor is to issue to this exercise after the Static Force Protection exercise. The students are expected to work on this exercise outside of teaching hours. Depending on the size of the course and number of syndicates, the instructor is to determine when the students will be expected to commence their briefs as per the course programme. The presentation of this exercise serves as a useful opportunity for senior officer or external guests to observe the product of the course. The student should be made aware of potential visitors to their presentation.

This exercise is written on the assumption that student do not have access to the internet and limited laptop computers. If the students do however have sufficient access to the internet and have computers, they may be given the actual location on Google Maps where this scenario was pulled from. This will enhance the student experience and make it more realistic. The location are

Start Point: 1.801558, 36.789945

Finish Point: 2.009130, 36.905104

You are the IED TM advisor to your HQ. You are to give a brief to the commander on risk reduction for the movement to the new FOB, as part of the wider mission planning.

Specific requirements. You are to:

- Carry out a Threat Assessment. Students should be able to determine a basic threat assessment by using historical IED attacks and description of the Insurgent force.
- Carry out a route analysis:
 - Establish your Areas of Interest (AOI) Some AOIs have been expanded in the power point slides but there are not exhaustive and others may be included.
 - Gather Information on all AOIs. The expanded images and historical IED data will assist the students. Furthermore, the student need to use what they have learned in previous lessons from VP and VA to make an assessment of the location. The student should request the use of UAV for gathering additional information on VAs and VPs.

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- Establish all VA's and VP's. Its is important to note that not all of the AOIs that have been expanded should be considered VPs or VA's. e.g. A bend in the road is not a VP if it does not require a vehicle to slow down. See additional information below for each map in detail.
- Assign mitigation measures to all VA's and VP's. These mitigation measures must be practically implementable and must actually reduce the risk. The instructor should scrutinize the students understanding of the mitigation measures. E.g. Conducting 5/25 is not a mitigation measure at a VP, it is a drill. A mitigation measure might be Conducting a search operation or by-passing the VP.
- Plan a convoy move implementing threat mitigations measures and coordinating all supporting assets.

You are to brief the following:

- Brief your threat assessment.
- Brief your route analysis.
- Brief your suggested mitigation measures.
- Brief a proposed Course of Action which incorporates
 - Task Org – this should cover what assets the team plan to deploy.
 - A scheme of manoeuvre (outline plan)
 - Phases of the operation
 - Key timings – the timings must take into account the mitigation measure. Eg if they plan to conduct search operations at 10 VPs, they must factor the additional c. time per VP into their plan.
 - Convoy plan i.e. What is the order of march and where are assets placed in the convoy including ECM to ensure coverage of whole convoy. The order of the convoy must consider where assets will be required when on the convoy and when carrying out mitigation measures. Additionally the ECM needs to be spread out to price complete cover for the convoy.
- What are your key risks and what do you require to address the risks.

Map in Detail Instructor Information.

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Map in Detail 1. The two IED incidents should be considered as Areas of Interest (AOI) but may be further discounted as VPs due to the direction of travel and the visibility from the FOB.

Map in Detail 2. Although a channeled area which would make it a VA, the visibility by the FOB means the students should consider this a safe area.

Map in Detail 3. The expanded section is used to highlight the type of road and the channeled nature of the route. This should lead the students to the conclusion that this may be vulnerable area. The area in which there were a number of previous IED strikes, dominated by high ground should lead the student to the conclusion that this is VA and they must apply a mitigation measure. The students could employ search teams here but the length of this VA this would take significant time that should be factored into the plan. Additional mitigation measures could be to deploy dismounts to dominate the high ground, deploy a UAV asset to identify potential triggermen and search for potential disturbance.

Map in Detail 4. The expanded images on the left shows a wide bend. As this area would not require a slow down, the student may discount it as a VP. If it is considered as a VP by the students it may be mitigated with simple bypass. The image on the right shows a slightly channelled area but not to the extent that requires a vehicle to slow down. Students may discount as a VP but if considered as a VP the type of device they would expect to find here would be a VOIED as there is nothing that would slow down the convoy. Mitigation measure here should be simple bypass.

Map in Detail 5. This area should certainly be considered a VP by the students. The mitigation measure could be a search of the main route, a small bypass but this must also include a search of any further VPs or a wide bypass. This option will be dependant on when the student plan to conduct the convoy. This wide bypass will not be possible after the rains start. The subsequent junction should be discounted as a VP as there is no need to slow down (see map 6).

Map in Detail 6. The first junction, although an AOI, should be discounted as a VP. The subsequent expanded areas may be considered as a VP. The third expanded area may be considered a VP or could be discounted by the student as the vegetation does not channel the convoy. The students could easily bypass or recommend a dynamic threat assessment when the convoy reached this AOI. the final expanded image must be considered a VP due to the severity of the channelling. Here the threat could be from either command or VOIED due to the channelling, slow down, linear features etc. The mitigation measure here must be a search operation. The student cannot bypass.

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Map in Detail 7. This must be considered a VP. A search operation must be conducted here. The type of device could either be VO or Command. Further considerations could be made to isolate the village during the search operation.

Map in Detail 8. The student should consider the previous attack sites as a VP, but this is in the context of a wider VA. Therefore, other mitigation measures would need to be included such as use of UAV to identify triggermen/firing points, dismounts to dominate high ground, CIMIC task to engage with local village. The students should consider that these additional activities would need to be conducted in advance of the convoy main body.

Map in Detail 9. the area within the limit of police visibility should be considered as safe.

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